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This study analyzes how banking crises affect European economies. First, we show that
European firms grow more slowly if they have relationships to crisis banks in their home
country. Second, we argue that the international affiliates of multinational corporations
grow more slowly when their parent firm is hit by a banking crisis in its home coun-
try. This suggests that the internal networks of multinational firms can transmit banking
crises across European countries. The effects could be sizable: for example, back-of-the-
envelope calculations suggest that a banking crisis in the US could lead to an estimated
decrease in sales in the German business economy of about 21 billion euros each year,
while a banking crisis in the UK could induce a sales loss of about 13 billion euros in the
German business economy. The results suggest that measures to prevent banking crises,
for example reductions in political risks (like Brexit) or Eurozone reforms (averting the
"diabolical loop"), would significantly reduce cross-country contagion of crises via firms –
and this way contribute to a smooth functioning of the real economy in the Single Market.
∗Huber: University of Chicago, kilianhuber@uchicago.edu; Ponattu: Bertelsmann Stiftung,
dominic.ponattu@bertelsmann-stiftung.de.
I Introduction
The relationship between banks and the real economy has generated substantial interest in
recent years. For example, many advanced economies experienced severe banking crises in
2008/09 and thereafter the deepest recessions since World War II (Gertler and Gilchrist 2018).
In early 2019, the weakness of several Italian banks and the poor performance of Deutsche
Bank, the largest financial institution in Germany, have again raised worries that a new episode
of banking distress might harm real growth in Europe (Reuters 2019a,b). In general, there
is a widespread view that banking crises can lead to severe recessions in the real economy
(Brunnermeier et al. 2013).
In this paper, we consider empirical evidence on the relationship between banking crises
and the growth of firms in the real economy. In particular, we discuss two questions. First, if
banks in a given country are in crisis, how does this affect firms resident in that country? Do
firms borrowing from crisis banks grow more slowly? Second, how are firms with operations
in multiple countries affected when their banks go into crisis? If a multinational firm is af-
fected by a banking crisis in its home country, does this also harm international affiliates of the
multinational firm in other countries?
This study documents that firms grow more slowly when their banks are in crisis and that
multinational firms transmit domestic banking crises to other countries through their foreign
affiliates. For example, we find that a banking crisis in the US could reduce sales in the Ger-
man business economy by more than 0.3% because of the transmission through affiliates of
US multinationals located in Germany. In case of a banking crisis in the UK, sales losses in
Germany could amount to about 0.2% because of this mechanism. We establish these results
by relying on recent research: Huber (2018) finds that firms with ties to crisis banks grow more
slowly in terms of investment and employment. Moreover, we also build on the findings in
Biermann and Huber (2019), who study the effect of a domestic banking crisis on foreign affil-
iates of multinational firms. They find that international affiliates of multinational firms hit by
a banking crisis have lower sales growth.
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These findings are relevant to ongoing reform debates in the Eurozone. A widely discussed
aspect of the ongoing Eurozone crisis has been the “diabolical loop” between banks and gov-
ernments: When the risk of government default rises, banks with high exposure to government
debt struggle to obtain funding and cut lending to the real economy (Brunnermeier et al. 2016).
This, in turn, can worsen the state of the domestic economy and increase the risk of government
default. For example, as seen in Ireland, a banking crisis can require massive fiscal engagement
and put fiscal stress on governments. Hence, there is a "vicious circle" between the financial
health of banks and sovereigns. One suggested reform to address the diabolical loop is the
EU banking union – an EU internal market for banking with common rules. The aim of the
banking union is to reduce the exposure of banks to sovereign risk and thereby to lower the
probability of banking crises. For example, one pillar of the banking union would be a com-
mon European deposit insurance scheme, which could ensure that depositors do not withdraw
funds from banks only because the national government is under fiscal stress (Schnabel and
Véron 2018). The findings of this paper show that banking crises in one EU member state can
have effects across the whole EU because of multinational firms. This strengthens the case for
coordinated reforms across countries that could reduce the probability of banking crises in the
EU, such as the banking union.
Finally, this paper is also relevant to the current debate on the UK’s plan to leave the EU
(Brexit). Some observers suggest that Brexit may weaken the UK banking system (Partington
2018). Our results suggest that a banking crisis in the UK could lead to a significant sales
losses of UK affiliates in other EU countries. Repercussions of this kind are not much part
of the current debate on economic effects of Brexit – but they suggest that beyond the mere
increase in trade costs, other EU countries’ real economies could be significantly affected by
Brexit. Furthermore, we show that the UK itself has a relatively high share of sales by foreign
affiliates. Thus, the UK economy could be negatively affected if foreign-owned firms reduce
their operations in the UK as a result of Brexit.
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II The Effect of a Banking Crisis on Firms Borrowing from Crisis Banks
The first question we want to understand is how firms evolve when banks in their country are in
crisis. A recent paper by Huber (2018) addresses the effect of a banking crisis on firm growth
in the context of German firms and the financial crisis of 2008/09. The key institutional feature
that Huber (2018) exploits is the system of relationship banking in Germany. Economic his-
tory (Jeidels 1905; Calomiris 1995), case studies (summarized in Guinnane 2002), and recent
evidence (Harhoff and Körting 1998; Elsas and Krahnen 1998; Elsas 2005) suggest that rela-
tionship banking has played an important role in German corporate finance from the start of
the 19th century until today. Relationship banking means that firms of all sizes form close and
durable business ties to their banks, which can reduce asymmetric information and improve
banks’ monitoring capabilities (Sharpe 1990; Boot 2000). The literature provides empirical
evidence from a number of countries and episodes that firms depend on the loan supply of
their relationship banks and that idiosyncratic shocks to relationship banks have real effects
on firms. Episodes that have been studied include the US Great Depression (Benmelech et al.
2017), Japan in the 1990s and 2000s (Amiti and Weinstein 2011), the 2008/09 financial crisis
in the US (Chodorow-Reich 2014), and the Great Recession in Spain (Bentolila et al. 2018).
Huber (2018) identifies a set of German firms whose relationship banks reduced lending in
the financial crisis of 2008/09. The reason for the lending cut was bank exposure to losses on
international financial markets in 2008/09. Since German firms depend on the loan supply of
their relationship banks, this meant that a few firms were hit with an exogenous shock to their
bank loan supply that was independent of the performance of the firm. By comparing firms
with a crisis bank to firms without a relationship to a crisis bank, Huber (2018) estimates how
a banking crisis causally affects firms.
A main finding of Huber (2018) is summarized by Figure I. This figure plots raw employ-
ment data for two groups of firms: those with a relationship to a crisis bank and those without.
Employment at firms with a relationship to a crisis bank developed in parallel to other firms
before 2008. Following the crisis of their banks in 2008/09, firms with a relationship to a crisis
bank experienced lower employment growth for two years. From 2011 onward, crisis banks
had generally stabilized, thanks to support by the government. Analyzing a survey conducted
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by the Munich ifo Institute among German firms, Huber (2018) finds that firms with a rela-
tionship to a crisis bank reported that their bank loan supply had returned to normal by 2011.
Standard economic theory predicts that firms with a relationship to a crisis bank should return
to the employment levels of unaffected firms once their credit supply normalizes. Nevertheless,
the affected firms remained on a lower parallel trend from 2011 until 2012.
Figure I: Effect of a banking crisis on firm employment
Notes: This figure plots mean employment (in logs) of firms without a relationship to a crisis bank and with a
relationship to a crisis bank. The data are normalized by their 2006 values. Source: Huber (2018).
The statistical results in Huber (2018) suggest that, following the reduction in bank lending,
employment at firms with only a crisis bank as relationship bank was 4.4 percent lower than at
firms with no relationship to a crisis bank. To test the robustness of this result, Huber (2018)
controls for a range of potentially confounding variables. There are industry fixed effects at
the three-digit level of the German industrial classification scheme WZ. There are also fixed
effects for four firm size bins, based on the firm’s number of employees in 2006. The bins are
for 1-49, 50-249, 250-999, and over 1000 employees. Further controls are the export share
out of total revenues, the import share out of total inputs, the firm’s age, and fixed effects
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for the county, in which the headquarter of the firm is located. Adding the set of control
variables, increases the estimate of the effect of a banking crisis on employment only slightly,
to 5.3 percent. This suggests that including the control variables does not strongly affect the
conclusions of the empirical analysis. Studies from other countries estimate firm-level effects of
a similar magnitude. For instance, Chodorow-Reich (2014) for the United States and Bentolila
et al. (2018) for Spain find that firms connected to distressed banks reduced employment by 4
to 5 percentage points.1
Other indicators of firm performance also responded to the lending cut. Firms with only
a crisis bank as relationship bank held on average 20.5 percent less bank debt over the period
2009 to 2012. This suggests that affected firms were not able to substitute other lenders for
their crisis banks, consistent with a financial system working through relationship banking.
The average investment rate of affected firms was 4.3 points lower over the four years after the
lending cut, while the capital stock fell by an average of 13 percent. The capital-labor ratio fell
by 7.7 percent, which suggests that firms use bank debt primarily to finance investment into
their capital stock.
The literature on the United States has found that large firms are less sensitive to credit
shocks (Gertler and Gilchrist 1994; Chodorow-Reich 2014). Huber (2018) finds no statistically
significant difference for large firms (over 1,500 employees) in the response of firm employ-
ment to a banking crisis. This suggests there were no heterogeneous effects by firm size. This
finding is in line with evidence from Spain in Bentolila et al. (2018) and with the conventional
wisdom that German firms of all sizes depend on bank debt, including multinational firms.
Figure II examines the effect of the lending cut on the patenting of firms. Patents are a
proxy for how much innovation a firm carries out. The sample for this figure includes only
firms that issued at least one patent from 1990 to 2004. These firms are interesting because
they are often large and control multinational affiliates. The results show that growth rate of
the number of patents at patenting firms was approximately 55 percentage points lower when
they only had a crisis bank as relationship bank. The average patenting process takes around
1Other related studies that estimate firm-level effects of banking crises include Gan (2007); Khwaja and Mian
(2008); Amiti and Weinstein (2011); Almeida et al. (2012); Schnabl (2012); Paravisini et al. (2015); Garicano and
Steinwender (2016); Cingano et al. (2016).
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two years. This is why the effect on patents is entirely driven by the years after 2011. There
was no significant difference before 2011.
Taken together, the effect on the patenting of large firms as well as the absence of hetero-
geneous effects by firm size suggest that also large firms were affected by a reduction in their
bank loan supply.
Figure II: Effect of a banking crisis on firm patents
Notes: This figure plots the estimated relationship between firm patents and the firm having a relationship to a
crisis bank. The estimates are from negative binomial count models, where the outcome is the firm’s number of
patents in the given year. The estimation controls for pre-existing differences in firm’s number of patents 1990-
2004 (in logs), firm size, age, industry, export and import share, and federal state of the firm’s headquarter. The
vertical lines are 95 percent confidence intervals. Source: authors’ calculations based on data from German firms
affected by crisis banks, as in Huber (2018).
III The Effect of a Domestic Banking Crisis on the Foreign Affiliates of Multina-
tional Firms
Having established that, on average, firms grew more slowly when they were affected by a
banking crisis, we now turn to our second question of interest. This concerns the effect of a
banking crisis in one country on firms and the real economy in another country. We focus on
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one specific channel: We consider whether the international affiliates of multinational corpo-
rations grow more slowly when their parent organization is hit by a banking crisis in its home
country.
Whether a firm is deemed a foreign affiliate depends on who controls the firm. If firm A has
the power to determine the business policy of foreign firm B, then firm B is a foreign affiliate
of firm A. In practice, a commonly used measure of control is the ownership of voting rights
in the firm. For example, the statistical agency of the European Union, Eurostat (2019), argues
that a firm is controlled by another entity if that entity “controls – directly or indirectly – more
than half of the shareholders’ voting power or more than half of the shares.”
Biermann and Huber (2019) estimate how the growth of an affiliate responds when its
multinational parent corporation is hit by a banking crisis. The empirical challenge is that
multinational firms and their affiliates are subject to common shocks. For example, if both af-
filiates and parents operate in the same industry and the industry experiences a global reduction
in demand, it would be spurious to attribute the co-movement between parents and affiliates to
shock transmission between them. Biermann and Huber (2019) overcome the empirical chal-
lenge by identifying a set of multinational parent corporations that were affected by a banking
crisis during the financial crisis 2008/09. They compare the foreign affiliates of parents with a
relationship to a crisis bank to the affiliates of parents without a relationship to a crisis bank.
Their analysis includes affiliates located in countries all over the world during the years 2002
until 2015.
The main outcome of interest is the sales growth of foreign affiliates. Sales growth is often
used as proxy for the productivity growth of firms in empirical studies. Furthermore, low sales
growth can indicate that firms face constraints in their production process. The empirical results
in Biermann and Huber (2019) show that, for the years before the financial crisis 2008/09,
there was no statistically significant relationship between the sales growth of affiliates and an
indicator for whether the parent had a relationship to a crisis bank. But after the crisis began in
2008, the sales of affiliates fell sharply if their parent had a relationship to a crisis bank. The
sales of affected affiliates remained lower than those of other affiliates in 2009 and 2010. After
2011, the relationship between the sales growth of affiliates and the parent having a relationship
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to a crisis bank essentially disappeared. This indicates that affiliates took around three years to
recover from the banking shock to their parents.
The estimates imply that, from 2008 to 2010, a one percent decrease in bank loans held
by the parent corporation lowered the average sales of international affiliates by 0.25 percent.
Biermann and Huber (2019) subject this finding to several robustness checks. The estimated
effects are robust when controlling for the size of the affiliate, its industry, and its country of
residence. This suggest that shocks to firms of certain sizes, to certain industries, or to certain
countries cannot explain the results. Overall, the findings suggest that a banking crisis in one
country can have real effects in other countries, due to the transmission of the shock through
the internal networks of multinational firms.
Having analyzed the effect on affiliate sales, Biermann and Huber (2019) turn toward the
mechanisms through which banking shocks to parents can affect affiliates. First, they examine
the asset side of the affiliate balance sheet. Affiliates that had parents with a relationship to
a crisis bank increased long-term loans to their parents from 2008 to 2010. This finding is
consistent with an efficient internal capital market. As parents faced a shock to credit supply,
affiliates stepped in and provided financing. The effect on long-term loans from affiliates to the
parent from 2011 to 2015 remained positive, although not statistically significant.
The next balance sheet item of interest are short-term claims on parents by affiliates. Short-
term claims within firms are a commonly used proxy of input-output flows between parents
and affiliates. Affiliates that had parents with a relationship to a crisis bank reduced short-term
claims on parents from 2008 to 2010. A decrease in short-term claims on the parent suggests
that there was a decrease in internal trade from affiliates to parents. A likely reason is that
there was a decrease in the demand for affiliates’ products by parents, which led to reduced
trade flows from affiliates to parents from 2008 to 2010. The coefficient for 2011 to 2015 is
statistically insignificant and implies a smaller decrease, compared to the 2008 to 2010 drop.
This partial recovery of short-term claims suggests that parents slightly increased their demand
for internal inputs from 2011. This could be one reason why affiliate sales were only lower from
2008 to 2010 and subsequently recovered. Finally, Biermann and Huber (2019) also consider
the equity that parents held in their affiliates. Parents significantly and persistently reduced
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equity, starting in 2008. This reduction in equity persisted until the end of the sample period in
2015. Since parent equity was on average 88 percent of total affiliate equity before 2008, this
represents a substantial financial shock to affiliates.
The next question is whether affiliates were able to overcome the effects of the banking
crisis by using other balance sheet channels. Liabilities to non-parents and equity from non-
parents hardly changed from 2008 to 2010, suggesting that initially affiliates were not able to
use other sources of funding to compensate for the loss of equity funding by parents. Liabilities
to non-parents were marginally higher from 2011 to 2015, although the effect is imprecisely
estimated. This indicates that affiliates may have raised debt from non-parents to finance their
sales recovery from 2011.
There was no significant effect on other long-term assets (i.e. total long-term assets minus
long-term loans to non-parents). Hence, affiliates did not cut lending to non-parents to make
up for increased lending to parents. The effect on other short-term assets (i.e. total short-term
assets minus short-term claims on parents) is negative and statistically significant from 2008 to
2010. This suggests that affiliates may have produced less for other, non-parent trading partners
after the banking crisis, possibly because they became financially constrained. Alternatively,
affiliates may have reduced their inventory holdings of raw materials because the parent de-
manded fewer products from the affiliate. The effect on other short-term assets disappears
from 2011, as the coefficient is positive and insignificant from 2011 to 2015. The full recovery
of other short-term assets suggests that affiliates’ production fully recovered from 2011. This
finding is consistent with the full recovery of sales from 2011. Overall, however, there is no
evidence that before 2011 affiliates were able to overcome the effects of the banking crisis by
using other balance sheet channels.
IV The Importance of Foreign Affiliates in European Economies
So far, we have established that firms grow more slowly when they are exposed to a banking
crisis. In addition, we have documented that foreign affiliates grow more slowly when their
parents are exposed to a banking crisis. Next, we consider whether the transmission of bank-
ing crises through the internal networks of multinational firms can affect aggregate outcomes
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in European economies. Is the transmission through multinationals large enough to make a
difference to aggregate sales?
To address this question, we first need to understand how important the affiliates of multi-
national firms are relative to aggregate European economies. Table I gives an overview of the
aggregate importance of foreign affiliates in European Union member states. The data are for
the year 2016 and provided by Eurostat, the statistical office of the European Union. Column 1
gives the total value of sales by firms in the business economy in million euros.2 Column 2 lists
the share of sales that is generated by foreign-owned affiliates. To be clear, this column does
not include the share of sales generated by multinational parents. It only measures the sales
share of foreign affiliates that are resident in the given country but controlled by organizations
in another country.
2The business economy is defined as firms in NACE Rev. 2 Sections B to N, excluding section K, plus division
S95. This means the business economy includes mining; manufacturing; electricity, gas, and water supply; waste
management; construction; real estate; wholesale and retail trade; transportation and storage; accommodation and
food service; information and communication services; professional, scientific and technical services; administra-
tive services. It does not include the financial, insurance, public, education, health, and arts sectors. For details,
see Eurostat (2019).
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Table I: The importance of foreign affiliates in European economies
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On aggregate, foreign affiliates are responsible for 28 percent of sales in the non-financial
business economies of member states of the European Union. Their share in value added is
similar, with around 25 percent of aggregate value added in the European Union. Only 1
percent of firms in European Union member states are foreign affiliates, which implies that the
average foreign affiliate is significantly larger than the average domestic firm.
The Mediterranean countries of Greece (15 percent of sales), Cyprus (15 percent), and Italy
(19 percent) have the lowest sales share of foreign affiliates. Countries in Eastern Europe, such
as Slovakia (52 percent), Hungary (51 percent), Romania (48 percent), and the Czech Republic
(47 percent) have the most sizable shares. The largest European economies all have shares in
the middle of the distribution, for example Germany with 24 percent, France with 21 percent,
and the United Kingdom with 35 percent. The correlation coefficient between total sales and
the sales share of foreign affiliates is -0.33, indicating that foreign affiliates tend to be more
important in smaller European economies.
Taken together, the data show that foreign affiliates play an important role in all countries
of the European Union. Across all European economies, they account for at least one-seventh
of total sales. In the three largest European economies, they account for at least one-fifth of
sales, and in some economies for over half of sales. These numbers imply that shocks to foreign
affiliates have the potential to drive aggregate outcomes. Since, by definition, foreign affiliates
are connected to firms in other countries, their aggregate importance also raises the possibility
that foreign affiliates import shocks from a foreign country to their country of residence.
V The Aggregate Impact: How Crisis Transmission Through Multinational
Firms affects European Economies
The final step in our empirical analysis is to approximate how large the aggregate losses can be
when multinational firms transmit a banking crisis from one country to another through their
internal networks. We begin by analyzing a concrete event: the reduction in lending by banks in
the United States during the financial crisis 2008/09. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) measure
how the financial crisis in the United States affected loans to large corporate borrowers, such
as multinational firms. They focus on syndicated loans, i.e. loans where a number of lenders
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come together to originate a loan. Syndicated loans are a common way for banks to lend to
large firms in the United States. Syndicated loans can take many forms, for example term loans,
credit lines, loans for restructuring, working capital, and general purpose lending. This makes
syndicated lending a relatively comprehensive measure of total lending to large US firms.
Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) find that syndicated lending was much lower during the
last quarter of 2008, relative to the previous quarter. They show that banks reduced lending
by more if they were more reliant on non-deposit funding (i.e. funding that comes from other
financial institutions, not from deposits by households). A two standard deviation increase in
the ratio of non-deposit funding over assets was associated with a decrease in the number of
loan originations by 28 percent. The freeze on non-deposit funding markets was a key feature
of the financial crisis 2008/09, suggesting that the drop in syndicated lending was related to the
crisis. Hence, we take the reduction in lending of 28 percent as approximate measure of the
contraction in credit supply by banks to large US borrowers because of the crisis.
With this measure of the lending reduction in hand, we estimate by how much the sales
of international affiliates of US multinationals decreased. As described above, Biermann and
Huber (2019) find that a one percent decrease in bank loans held by a multinational firm lowered
the average sales of its international affiliates by 0.25 percent. Hence, a 28 percent lending
reduction would lead to a decrease of 28*0.25 = 7 percent in sales by the international affiliates
of US multinationals.
The final step in the calculation is to relate the 7 percent decrease in sales of affiliates of
US multinationals to the aggregate importance of US affiliates in foreign economies. Data for
the total sales share of US affiliates are not available for all countries. Instead, we focus on
Germany, the largest European economy, where the aggregate importance of international affil-
iates is approximately in the middle of the distribution of European economies. Affiliates of US
multinationals account for 4.91 percent of total sales by firms in the German business economy,
excluding the financial sector. If all of them decrease their sales by 7 percent, total non-financial
business sales in Germany would fall by 0.07*4.91=0.34 percent or 21 billion euros. To put
this number into perspective, real non-financial business sales in Germany fell by 4.33 percent
from 2008 to 2009. This suggests that the shock transmission through multinationals can have
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quantitatively important effects on aggregate outcomes.
The calculation above has relied on several simplifying assumptions. We have assumed
that: changes in the sales of US affiliates did not have general equilibrium effects on other
firms in Germany; government policy did not endogenously respond to the decrease in US
affiliate sales; and the exchange rate did not adjust. These assumptions are unlikely to hold in
practice. This will introduce some error into the analysis. For example, the calculation might
understate the true aggregate impact if input-output linkages between US affiliates and German
firms are important. In the opposite direction, the calculation might exaggerate the aggregate
effect if US affiliates lost customers to German firms or if the Dollar depreciated relative to the
Euro. Despite these sources of potential error, the calculation allows us to at least gauge the
aggregate impact of the transmission through multinational firms’ internal networks.
We carry out thought experiments for six additional countries: the United Kingdom, Italy,
Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and Greece. For each country, we assume that its banks face a crisis of
similar magnitude to the financial crisis 2008/09 in the United States. That amounts to assuming
that the average multinational corporation resident in that country suffers a decrease in its bank
loans of 28 percent. As described above, this will result in a decrease of 7 percent in the sales of
the international affiliates with parents in that country, according to the estimates in Biermann
and Huber (2019). We then calculate by how much sales in the German non-financial business
economy would decline because of the decrease in sales by international affiliates resident in
Germany. We use the German economy as illustrative example because consistent data are
available for Germany. But, as Table I shows, international affiliates play an important role
in all European economies. Hence, the economic mechanisms we consider apply to European
countries more generally.
Table II presents the results. Differences in the estimated sales decrease across the six
countries are entirely driven by differences in the importance of affiliates from these countries
to the German economy. Affiliates controlled by entities in the United Kingdom account for
3.09 percent of sales in the German non-financial business economy. So, when a banking
crisis hits multinationals in the United Kingdom, the shock transmission to affiliates resident in
Germany could have significant effects on the performance of the aggregate German economy.
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The estimate suggests that sales in the German non-financial business economy could drop
by 0.22 percent or 14 billion euros. This scenario is of interest given the current discussions
about the economic repercussions of the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union.
Some observers, including the Bank of England, have warned that the exit could harm financial
stability (Partington 2018). If indeed the banking sector in the United Kingdom is negatively
affected, the activities of multinational firms may transmit the effects of the UK banking shock
to Germany and other European countries.
In recent years, there has been much discussion about the health of the banking system in
Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, and Greece. Table II lists how banking crises in these countries
could affect the German economy if multinationals transmit the banking shock to their Ger-
man affiliates. Affiliates controlled by entities in Italy, Spain, and Ireland are responsible for
between 0.3 and 0.45 percent of sales in the German non-financial business economy. Accord-
ingly, shocks to these affiliates have the potential to affect aggregate outcomes in Germany.
Sales in the German non-financial business economy could fall between 0.021 and 0.031 per-
cent. Entities resident in Portugal and Greece control only a small share of sales. Therefore,
it is less likely that a banking crisis in Portugal and Greece would have large effects on the
German business economy through multinational firms’ networks. Notably, a banking crisis
in Italy, currently under close watch by the EU Commission’s fiscal rules framework, could
translate into a sales loss of about 0.031% (or 2 billion euros) in Germany. A banking crisis in
Spain would exhibit an impact on sales in the German business economy of about 0.024% or
1.5 billion euros in losses. But overall, the effects stemming from these countries are relatively
moderate compared to the larger or more open economies listed in Table II.
Tables III and IV run the same analyses for sales reductions in two other countries, the
UK and Italy. The UK is an open economy with a relatively high share of foreign affiliates,
as shown in Table I. In addition, its economy quite heavily relies on banking. Consequently,
the UK’s real economy could be particularly vulnerable to banking crises in other economies.
The estimates suggest that a banking crisis in large economies like Germany (about 0.3% or 11
billion euros) and France (about 0.2% or 7 billion euros) could severely hit the UK economy,
which is already struggling with worries about Brexit and the implications for the UK banking
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sector. Entities resident in countries like Portugal and Greece control few firms in the UK,
leading to a rather small impact on the UK economy as a result of potential crises in these
countries. In Italy, there are worries about a potential sovereign debt crisis given the country’s
high debt-to-GDP ratio, low growth prospects, and its struggle over the budget with the EU
Commission. Banking crises in the US and the France would have a notable negative impact
on sales in Italy of about 0.22% and 0.28% or 6 to 8 billion euros, respectively. Again, Portugal
and Greece have few entities controlling firms in Italy, so that Portuguese and Greek banking
crises would have little impact on Italy through the channel of foreign affiliates.
Table II: Estimated sales reduction in Germany due to banking crisis in another country
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Table III: Estimated sales reduction in the UK due to banking crisis in another country
Table IV: Estimated sales reduction in Italy due to banking crisis in another country
20
VI Conclusion
This study builds on current research on banking crises to argue that multinational firms can
transmit banking crises across countries, potentially leading to sizable aggregate losses in the
Eurozone. We document that a banking crisis in major economies could severely affect aggre-
gate outcomes in the German economy. For instance, we show that a banking crisis in the US
could lead to a decrease in sales in the German economy (excluding the financial sector) of
0.3%. The extent to which a banking crisis affects other countries through multinational firms
depends on the origin of a hypothetical banking crisis. The sales loss in Germany could be as
high as 0.2% in case of a banking crisis in the UK and 0.031% in Italy. But the sales losses
would amount to just 0.002% in the case of a banking crisis originating in Portugal.
We base these results on two factors documented in recent research. First, firms exposed to
a banking crisis in their home country grow more slowly. Second, novel research shows that
foreign affiliates grow more slowly if their parent company is hit by a banking crisis abroad.
Thus, domestic crises can spread through internal networks within multinational firms and
thereby become international crises.
We also report that foreign affiliates are of significant importance in EU economies. The
share of sales by foreign affiliates is particularly high in small, open Western European
economies (like the Netherlands with a sales share of 0.38%). Also, foreign affiliates matter in
Eastern European economies such as Poland (0.39%), Romania (0.48%) and Slovakia (0.52%)
– clearly reflecting the nature of value chains across the EU, for example, in the automotive
industry.
The findings on shock transmission in this paper have a number of implications relevant for
policy making. The first relates to EU reform initiatives, such as the banking union. The unified
set of rules for standards and supervision of banks is meant to contribute to preventing (or better
managing) banking crises. Similarly, the proposed capital markets union could reduce home
bias in the investment of banks, firms, and households, which – in turn – may well be conducive
to stabilizing the banking system. The findings of this paper show that banking crises in one
EU member state can have effects across the whole EU because of multinational firms. This
strengthens the case for coordinated reforms across countries that could reduce the probability
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of banking crises in the EU, such as the banking union and the capital market union.
Second, the results also have implications for the current debate on the UK’s exit from the
European Union (Brexit). Some observers argue that a hard Brexit could increase the likelihood
of a banking crisis in the UK. Our analysis indicates that, given the importance of affiliates
controlled by UK multinationals in EU economies, a UK banking crisis could have severe
consequences in large EU economies, such as Germany. Such effects are not discussed to a
great extent in current analyses of consequences of Brexit on other EU economies, as these
analyses mainly focus on effects from increased trading costs for bilateral trade flows with the
UK.
The findings of this paper should be seen as a rough estimate of how multinational firms
could transmit negative effects of banking crises across countries – and thereby affect aggregate
economies. It is important to point out that our analysis does not account for cross-country and
within-country general equilibrium effects and policy responses that could mitigate any sales
reduction. But it should also be noted that general equilibrium effects of banking crises could
reinforce the sales reduction. Our simplified assumptions are helpful to gauge the extent to
which multinational firms could matter for crises transmission. Future research could focus
on a theoretical framework to analyze general equilibrium effects of crisis transmission via
multinational firms.
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Appendix
Figure III: Real GDP in advanced economies
Notes: The figure shows real GDP (in logs, relative to 2006) in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the
United States. Source: Huber (2018) using data from the IMF.
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